Runescape e dating

04 Apr

The offense conduct in this case could have been extremely severe had he acted upon the threats.I need to address his abuse of alcohol and narcotics.DISCUSSIONOn appeal, Pillault claims that the district court erred in applying the six-level enhancement under § 2A6.1(b)(1) because, Pillault contends, he did not commit an overt act that was substantially and directly connected to the offensive threat. Goynes, 175 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir.1999) (requiring “some form of overt act” to sustain an enhancement under § 2A6.1(b)(1)); U. Walker, 742 F.3d at 616; see also Garza, 706 F.3d at 660 (“Our limited precedent post-Tapia has described the distinction between legitimate commentary and inappropriate consideration as whether rehabilitation is a ‘secondary concern’ or an ‘additional justification’ (permissible) as opposed to a ‘dominant factor’ (impermissible) informing the district court's decision.”). In the present case, the district court discussed the defendant's history, including his lack of meaningful work history, his extensive disciplinary record in school, and his self-proclaimed ability to “con [his] way back into [his] family members' hearts.” The court then stated:․ I have a great responsibility not to make one mistake․ And what I've seen of your history does not warrant this Court making a mistake for you.Notably, “[a] court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.” Tapia, 131 S. Now, the sentence to be imposed will be above the advisory guidelines range because of the nature and circumstances of this offense and the history and characteristics of this defendant pursuant to 18 USC Section 3553(a)(2) [sic]․The sentence should reflect the seriousness of the offense, should promote respect for the law and provide just punishment. And in the letters that I read, which I want to make part of this proceeding, there was very little concerns about protecting the public. Now, I will agree it also needs to be protected from further crimes by you. Players can communicate with each other by typing comments, which appear above the players' characters as well as in a chat box at the bottom of the screen. At sentencing, the district court imposed a six-level enhancement, pursuant to Section 2A6.1(b)(1) of the U. Runescape is a fantasy role-playing game that is played online.

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Attorney's Office, Oxford, MS, for Plaintiff–Appellee. The FBI also obtained a search warrant for electronic devices, which it executed that same day.Pillault also denied GF1's account of the Home Depot visit and claimed that while he did possess a copper pipe, he found it in a park and did not ever make, or plan to make, a bomb with it. Specifically, the PSR cited Pillault's trip to Home Depot to obtain a copper pipe for the purpose of making a pipe bomb as well as his “testing” of Molotov cocktails. 1 (“[C]onduct that occurred prior to the offense must be substantially and directly connected to the offense, under the facts of the case taken as a whole.”). § 3553(a)(1), and because the court gave significant weight to Pillault's need for treatment, in violation of Tapia v. Ramos–Delgado, 763 F.3d 398, 400 (5th Cir.2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While Pillault denied any actual intent to carry out his threat and denied ever making, or trying to make, a bomb, the district court, presented with conflicting testimony, made a necessary and valid credibility determination. Davis, 754 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir.2014) (explaining that credibility determinations “in sentencing hearings are peculiarly within the province of the trier-of-fact” (quoting United States v. The district court explicitly stated that it found GF1 and GF2 “more believable” than Pillault and emphasized that Pillault's testimony “was self-serving.” In light of the court's credibility determinations, as well as the record as a whole, it is plausible that Pillault intended to carry out his threat to obtain guns, “backup clips, [Molotov] cocktails, [and] pipe bombs” and “level oxford hi[g]h school.” The district court's findings that Pillault actually obtained a copper pipe to make a pipe bomb and tested a home-made Molotov cocktail, and that these overt acts evidenced an intent to carry out the threat, were not clearly erroneous. First, this court must determine whether the district court committed a procedural error, “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence․” Id. If the sentence is procedurally sound, this court then determines whether the sentence is substantively reasonable, applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. The forum in which the threats were made was not the only circumstance of the offense, and the court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the nature of the threatened conduct outweighed the fact that the comments were made in an online context. Accordingly, we find that the district court's upward variance from the Guidelines was substantively reasonable. at 51 (explaining that a district court commits a procedural error when it “fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range”). Having elaborated on this public protection concern, the court was not obligated to detail the “particular offense circumstances ․ justifying a sentence outside the guideline range,” as Pillault contends. United States, by giving significant weight to Pillault's need for mental health and drug and alcohol treatment when choosing the given sentence. Post-Tapia, this court has explained that “a sentencing court errs if a defendant's rehabilitative needs are ‘a “dominant factor” ․ [that] inform[s] the district court's [sentencing] decision.” ’ United States v.Pillault also denied ever having made Molotov cocktails out of Sprite bottles, as GF2 claimed. Pillault objected to this enhancement, but the district court overruled the objection. Second, Pillault claims that the district court's sentence was unreasonable because it did not account for the nature and circumstances of the offense, as mandated by 18 U. In the present case, the district court's determination that Pillault's conduct evidenced an intent to carry out the underlying threat is a factual finding, reviewed for clear error. The district court's factual finding “is not clearly erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record read as a whole.” United States v. Stated another way, “we will deem the district court's factual findings clearly erroneous only if, based ‘on the entire evidence,’ we are ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ “ Cabrera, 288 F.3d at 168 (quoting Cooper, 274 F.3d at 238). Pillault's actions could properly be considered actual steps toward the realization of his threat. Further, the district court gave significant weight to Pillault's potential future dangerousness and the court's duty to protect the public. Within his argument regarding the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, Pillault states that the “court did not articulate, with the fact-specific reasons that are required when imposing an above-guidelines sentence, the particular offense circumstances on which the court was relying and how those circumstances support an above—guidelines sentence.” This seems to be an attack on the procedural reasonableness of the sentence, rather than the substantive reasonableness. This court has stated that “the district court must more thoroughly articulate its reasons when it imposes a non-Guideline sentence than when it imposes a sentence under authority of the Sentencing Guidelines.” Smith, 440 F.3d at 707. Here, the district court did articulate fact-specific reasons for its imposed sentence. Accordingly, we find that to the extent Pillault claims that the district court procedurally erred by not adequately explaining its reasons for the chosen sentence, that claim fails.2. In Tapia, the Supreme Court held that “a court may not impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.” 131 S. Walker, 742 F.3d 614, 616 (5th Cir.2014) (quoting United States v.Pillault discussed at length the harsh culture of online gaming as well as the specific circumstances surrounding his threatening comments, including the fact that he and another player had been “trolling” each other, which Pillault defined as following someone and “saying random things to upset” them. The court concluded that “the testimony of the Government is much more believable than the testimony of the defendant on the objections raised by the defendant .” The court found GF1's and GF2's testimony to be credible and determined that Pillault did have the intent to carry out his threats. Section 2A6.1(b)(1) provides: “If the offense involved any conduct evidencing an intent to carry out such threat, increase by 6 levels.” In order to determine whether the enhancement applies, the court should “consider both conduct that occurred prior to the offense and conduct that occurred during the offense; however, conduct that occurred prior to the offense must be substantially and directly connected to the offense, under the facts of the case taken as a whole.” U. See Goynes, 175 F.3d at 355 (finding enhancement unwarranted where the defendant's act was “not in any way an actual step toward the realization” of his threat). United States, the Supreme Court developed a two-step process for appellate review of a sentence. While these reasons “should be fact-specific and consistent with the sentencing factors enumerated in section 3553(a),” the district court does not need to “engage in ‘robotic incantations that each statutory factor has been considered.’ “ Id. Above all, the court focused on its “duty to protect the public.” See 18 U. Garza, 706 F.3d 655, 660 (5th Cir.2013)); see also United States v. Cir.2014) (“[W]e have held that Tapia error occurs when rehabilitation is a dominant factor in the court's sentencing decision, and we have never required the appellant to establish that the court's improper reliance on rehabilitation considerations was the sole factor in sentencing.”).The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), prepared by the United States Probation Service prior to sentencing, applied a six-level enhancement for “conduct evidencing an intent to carry out [the] threat.” U. The court sentenced Pillault to seventy-two months imprisonment, forty-eight months longer than the advisory guideline range. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's application of the six-level enhancement. On the other hand, the district court does not violate Tapia if the need for rehabilitation is only a “secondary concern” or an “additional justification” for the sentence.